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The	Necessity	of	a	Jewish	Systematic	Theology1	A.	Vincent	University	of	Chester	2016		I.			Before	engaging	in	an	argument	about	the	need	to	enshrine	Jewish	Theology	as	a	distinct	discipline	in	the	academy,	it	is	useful	to	outline,	briefly,	the	wider	context	in	 which	 such	 an	 argument	 takes	 place.	 The	 place	 of	 Jewish	 Theology	 is	dependent	in	part	upon	its	relationship	to	Christian	Systematic	theology,	and	the	place	of	that	discipline	has	 itself	been	in	question	over	the	past	several	years.	 I	will	here	contend	that	(1)	the	place	of	Christian	theology	is	best	secured	within	the	academy	by	the	introduction	of	non-Christian	theologies	alongside	it,	and	(2)	that	securing	a	place	for	theological	study	is	beneficial	to	the	academic	study	of	religion	as	a	whole;	these	arguments	will	develop	side	by	side	as	distinct,	but	not	separable—the	 importance	of	 the	 former	 is	dependent	on	the	 legitimacy	of	 the	latter.		Two	events	in	the	academic	year	2015-2016	draw	attention	usefully	to	tensions	regarding	the	construction	of	theology	and	religious	studies	as	a	discipline,	and		the	 content	 of	 “religion”	 in	 general,	 both	 within	 the	 academy	 and	 in	 the	perception	of	an	increasingly	secularised2	public	which	the	academy	serves.	The	first	 incident,	 a	 controversy	 over	 the	 candidates	 for	 Vice	 President	 of	 the	American	Academy	of	Religion	in	November	2015,	is	illustrative	of	the	tensions	within	the	broad	discipline	of	Theology	and	Religious	Studies	which	necessarily	inform	 any	 discussion	 about	 the	 place	 of	 non-Christian	 theologies	 in	 the	academy,	and	therefore	provides	grounding	for	my	contention	that	the	way	the	boundary	 between	Theology	 and	Religious	 Studies—or	History	 of	 Religion—is	drawn	 leaves	 non-Christian	 scholars	 of	 non-Christian	 traditions	 locked	 out	 of	productive	 work	 in	 both	 disciplines,	 that	 this	 exclusion	 is	 bad	 for	 the	 field	 in	general	and	theology	in	particular,	and	that	it	is	best	addressed	from	within	the	discipline	of	theology.			Officers	of	 the	American	Academy	of	Religion	 typically	 serve	 three-year	 terms,	with	the	exception	of	the	President,	who	serves	only	one	year	in	that	particular	office—but	 the	 Presidential	 year	 is	 preceded	 by	 a	 one	 year	 term	 as	 President	Elect,	and	that	term	is	preceded	by	a	one	year	term	as	Vice	President.	The	office																																																									1	With	gratitude	to	M.	A.	Godin	for	research	assistance.	2	I	use	this	word	with	great	hesitation,	as	secularity	is	too	often	understood	as	a	state	of	religious	neutrality,	 in	 which	 the	 public	 exercises	 no	 preference	 between,	 and	 possesses	 no	 particular	knowledge	of,	any	religious	system.	This	understanding	is	already	rooted	in	Christian	concerns,	a	tendency	 to	 measure	 religiosity	 in	 terms	 of	 membership	 of	 and	 participation	 in	 particular	institutions;	it	fails	to	account	for	the	latency	of	religious	worldviews	which	still	inform	the	social	order	even	in	nations	with	markedly	low	church	attendance	(such	as	Sweden	and	the	UK)	or	for	the	sharp	differences	in	the	way	that	the	secular	space	is	experienced	by	non-Christians	and	non-practising	 Christians--see	 Talal	 Asad,	 Formations	 of	 the	 Secular:	 Christianity,	 Islam,	 Modernity	(Stanford:	Stanford	UP,	2003).	Nevertheless,	the	past	century	has	quite	clearly	seen	a	shift	in	the	way	that	Christianity	occupies	public	space,	and	the	way	that	religion	in	general	is	understood	by	the	public.	
of	Vice	President	 is	 the	 only	 office	 in	 the	presidential	 life-cycle	 that	 involves	 a	direct	election,	and	voting	for	Vice	President	is	essentially	voting	for	the	person	who	will	be	president	two	years	from	now.	Nominees	are	 identified	and	vetted	by	 the	Nominations	Committee.	 The	process	by	which	 the	 committee	works	 is	not	 especially	 transparent;	 there	 is	 a	 long	history	of	 the	 committee	presenting	two	 nominees	 for	 each	 office	who	 are	 from	 substantially	 similar	 demographic	and	disciplinary	backgrounds.	For	example,	the	2015	nominees	for	Treasurer	are	both	 senior	male	 scholars	 of	 Jewish	 Studies;	 the	 2014	 nominees	 for	 Secretary	were	 both	male	 scholars	 of	 American	Religious	History.	 Also	 in	 2014,	 the	 two	choices	 for	 Vice	 President	 were	 both	 male	 African	 American	 Christian	theologians;	in	2013,	two	white	Christian	women—a	professor	of	the	history	of	Christianity	and	a	professor	of	Christian	theology—and	in	2011	the	choice	was	between	two	white	Ashkenazi	Jewish	woman,	a	scholar	of	psychology	of	religion	and	 a	 scholar	 of	 ethics.	 The	 Nominations	 Committee,	 in	 short,	 has	 historically	taken	 upon	 itself	 the	 task	 of	 ensuring	 demographic	 and	 disciplinary	 diversity	amongst	 the	 AAR’s	 elected	 officers	 by	 ensuring	 that	 elections	 in	 which	 one	identifiable	 subset	 of	 the	 academy’s	 membership	 is	 pitched	 against	 another	identifiable	 subset	 simply	 never	 happen.	 Whether	 or	 not	 one	 commends	 this	strategy,	and	the	assumptions	about	the	nature	of	“diversity”	which	animate	it,	it	has	been	the	AAR’s	standard	operating	procedure	for	quite	a	few	years,	with	few	complaints,	up	until	2015,	when	the	two	nominees	for	Vice	President	were	both	male	 Christian	 theologians	 from	 relatively	 conservative	 Evangelical	backgrounds,	 who	 explicitly	 named	 the	 issue	 of	 Evangelical	 Christians	 feeling	unwelcome	 in	 the	 Academy	 as	 an	 issue	 they	 intend	 to	 prioritise	 during	 their	term	of	service.		This	 touched	 a	 nerve	 amongst	 scholars	 whose	 primary	 disciplinary	 and	methodological	 commitment	 is	 to	 the	 study	of	 religion	 from	a	 critical,	 outsider	perspective—the	most	vocal	of	which,	at	least	in	the	circles	which	overlap	with	my	own,	were	Michael	 J.	Altman	and	Russell	T.	McCutcheon.3	Altman	protested	that	 the	 candidates	 put	 forward	 do	 not	 fulfil	 the	 Nominations	 Committee’s	mandate	 to	 select	 candidates	 which	 enhance	 the	 diversity	 of	 the	 Board	 of	Directors,	 having	 understood	 the	 nomination	 pattern	 I	 detailed	 above	 as	presenting	 demographically	 similar	 candidates	 who,	 nonetheless,	 have	 been	positioned	on	 either	 side	of	 the	methodological	 divide	 (one	more	 theologically	oriented,	 one	more	oriented	 towards	 critical	 study).	 	McCutcheon,	 by	 contrast,	noted	 the	 pattern	 of	 previous	 nominations	 (with	 the	 exception	 of	 2011)	 being	slanted	 very	much	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 study	 of	 Christianity	 and	 suggests	 that	 the	troublesome	 issue	 in	2015	was	 that	neither	 candidate	 falls	 comfortably	within	the	 liberal	 theological	bias	of	 the	academy,	 characterising	 the	 controversy	as	 a	whole	 as	 symptomatic	 of	 “the	 problems	 of	 theology	 being	 seen	 as	 an	academically	 legitimate	 pursuit	 within	 the	 study	 of	 religion”.	 McCutcheon	 has	asserted	 that	 legitimate	 scholarship	 is	 primarily,	 if	 not	 purely,	 descriptive,	oriented	 towards	 understanding	 religion	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 human	 behaviour,	 as	distinct	from	human	experience	or	human	culture.	Altman	has	further	expressed																																																									3	 Altman:	 http://michaeljaltman.net/2015/10/15/the-aar-vice-presidential-election-and-the-illusion-of-choice/		Accessed	16	March	2016.		McCutcheon:	http://religion.ua.edu/blog/2015/10/the-tremendous-irony-of-it-all/	Accessed	16	March	2016.	
the	 view	 that	 theology	 is	 academically	 illegitimate	 because	 it	 is	 impossible	 to	apply	properly	empirical	methods	to	the	task	of	“describing	God”.			II.	The	second	incident	which	garnered	wider	public	recognition,	was	the	firing	of	Larycia	 Hawkins	 from	 the	 political	 science	 department	 of	 Wheaton	 College,	Illinois.	On	10	December	2015,	Dr	Hawkins	made	a	Facebook	post	declaring	her	intention	 to	wear	 a	 hijab	 “as	 part	 of	my	Advent	worship”,	 in	 order	 to	 express	“religious	 solidarity”	 with	 her	 Muslim	 neighbours,	 because	 “as	 Pope	 Francis	stated	last	week,	we	worship	the	same	God.”9	On	15	December,	Wheaton,	which	is	 a	 private	 college	 with	 a	 commitment	 to	 evangelical	 Christianity,10	 placed	Hawkins	 on	 administrative	 leave	 “in	 order	 to	 give	 more	 time	 to	 explore	significant	questions	regarding	the	theological	 implications	of	her	recent	public	statements,	 including	 but	 not	 limited	 to	 those	 indicating	 the	 relationship	 of	Christianity	 to	 Islam.”11	 On	 5	 January,	 the	 College	 initiated	 termination	procedures	against	Hawkins,	citing	her	refusal	“to	participate	in	further	dialogue	about	 the	 theological	 implications	 of	 her	 public	 statements”.12	 The	 implication	was	that	Hawkins’s	statement	violated	the	College’s	Statement	of	Faith;	that	the	assertion	 that	Muslims	 and	 Christians	 worship	 the	 same	 God	 undermined	 the	evangelical	ethos	of	the	College.			This	 incident	 attracted	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 public	 comment	 and	 debate,	 mostly	focussed	 on	 the	 validity	 of	 Hawkins’s	 initial	 claim--and	 the	 consequent	correctness	 of	 the	 College’s	 move	 to	 terminate	 her.	 While	 many	 of	 the	commentators	weighing	in	on	the	issue	were	themselves	theologians,	the	extent	of	wider	media	attention	the	incident	received	is	suggestive	of	a	notable	degree	of	 public	 interest,	 likely	 undergirded	 by	 more	 generalised	 anxieties	 about	Muslim	integration	in	the	United	States.	Just	as	these	anxieties	are	not	restricted	solely	 to	 the	US,	however,	 the	 theological	 arguments	put	 forward	both	 for	 and	against	Hawkins’s	position	are	not	restricted	solely	to	the	question	of	boundaries	between	 Christianity	 and	 Islam;	 they	 are	 really	 arguments	 about	 the	 ways	 in	which	 and	 extent	 to	 which	 Christian	 understandings	 of	 God	 can	 and	 should	account	for	the	existence	of	other	religions.																																																										9	The	original	post	has	either	been	made	private	or	removed	from	Facebook,	but	it	is	archived	at	https://web.archive.org/web/20151216182237/https://www.facebook.com/larycia/posts/10153326773658481	(Accessed	30	August	2016).	 It	 is	unclear	which	particular	statement	of	Pope	Francis	Hawkins	 is	referring	to;	 in	 late	November	he	undertook	an	Apostolic	 Journey	to	Kenya,	Uganda,	 and	 the	Central	African	Republic,	 during	which	he	made	 a	 number	 of	 speeches	which	touched	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	 Christians	 and	 Muslims,	 and	 while	 these	 speeches	 did	convey	the	general	sense	which	Hawkins	reports,	I	have	been	unable	to	identify	one	which	made	use	of	the	precise	words	that	she	references.	10	See	Wheaton’s	Statement	of	Faith	at	http://www.wheaton.edu/About-Wheaton/Statement-of-Faith-and-Educational-Purpose	(accessed	30	August	2016).	11	 Again,	 the	 original	 statement	 from	 the	 College	 is	 no	 longer	 available,	 but	 is	 archived	 at	https://web.archive.org/web/20160123214915/http://www.wheaton.edu/Media-Center/Media-Relations/Statements/Frequently-Asked-Questions-Regarding-Dr-Larycia-Hawkins-Administrative-Leave-from-Wheaton-College	(Accesed	30	August	2016).	12	 https://web.archive.org/web/20160219075340/http://www.wheaton.edu/Media-Center/Media-Relations/Statements/Statement-Regarding-Notice-of-Recommendation-to-Initiate-Termination-of-Dr-Larycia-Hawkins	Accessed	30	August	2016.	
	Notable	 among	 these	 are	 Miroslav	 Volf’s	 editorial	 in	 The	 Washington	 Post,	 in	which	 he	 explicitly	 notes	 the	 parallel	 between	 Islam	 and	 Judaism’s	 doctrinal	positions	 regarding	 the	 Trinity,	 and	 the	 therefore	 puzzling	 discontinuity	 in	Christian	 reactions	 to	 the	 two	 non-Trinitarian	 Abrahamic	 faiths:	 “Instead	 of	rejecting	the	God	of	the	Jews,	Christians	affirmed	that	they	worship	the	same	God	as	the	Jews,	but	noted	that	the	two	religious	groups	understand	God	in	in	partly	different	 ways.”13	 Volf’s	 appeal	 to	 history	 in	 this	 editorial	 is	 academically	problematic;	 even	 leaving	 aside	 his	 sanitized	 gloss	 over	 the	 history	 of	contestation	between	Christians	and	Jews	over	the	nature	of	the	same	God	which	they	 worshipped,	 the	 neglect	 of	 historical	 causality	 required	 to	 reduce	 the	theological	resistance	among	evangelical	Christians	to	a	simple	matter	of	politics,	in	which	Muslims	are	the	enemy	and	“It	is	not	just	that	we	insist	that	we	aren’t	our	enemies;	we	cannot	have	anything	in	common	with	them	either”	does	very	little	to	illuminate,	let	alone	open	a	solution	for,	the	theological	problem.	Due	to	the	Gospels’	grounding	in	and	intertextual	relationship	with	 	Hebrew	prophetic	literature,	 Christians	 have	 little	 alternative	 to	 accepting	 that	 they	worship	 the	same	God	as	Jews;	Christian	scripture	has	no	such	dependency	upon	the	Quran,	and	 so	 Christians	 are	 less	 constrained	 in	 the	 terms	 in	 which	 they	 understand	Islamic	theology.										III.	The	 problem	 with	 McCutcheon’s	 restrictive	 view	 of	 legitimate	 scholarship	 as	being	 concerned	 exclusively	 with	 explaining	 religion	 as	 an	 aspect	 of	 human	behaviour	is	that	it	is	ideologically	pre-committed	to	at	least	the	same	extent	as	scholarship	which	presumes	 some	validity,	 however	 limited,	 to	 the	 claims	of	 a	particular	 religion	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 its	 study—and,	 in	 my	 view,	 McCutcheon’s	approach	 is	 far	 more	 pernicious	 in	 its	 ideological	 pre-commitments	 for	 the	degree	to	which	it	denies	and	therefore	obscures	participation	in	an	ideological																																																									13	 Volf,	Miroslav	 “Wheaton	 professor’s	 suspension	 is	 about	 anti-Muslim	 bigotry,	 not	 theology”,	
Washington	 Post	 17	 December	 2015	 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/17/wheaton-professors-suspension-is-about-anti-muslim-bigotry-not-theology/	Accessed	31	August	2016.	Volf’s	argument	is	supported,	and	elaborated	upon,	by	Bruce	L.	 McCormack,	 “”Reflections	 on	 the	 ‘Same	 God’	 Thesis”,	http://noahtoly.tumblr.com/post/137130607348/reflections-on-the-same-god-thesis-by-bruce	Accessed	 31	 August	 2016.	 McCormack’s	 argument	 is	 further	 elaborated	 upon	 by	 Ben	 Myers,	“Another	 thing	 about	 Wheaton:	 do	 Christians	 and	 Jews	 worship	 the	 same	 God?”,	 Faith	 and	
Theology	 13	 January	 2016	 <http://www.faith-theology.com/2016/01/another-thing-about-wheaton-do.html>	Accessed	31	August	2016.	Myers	arrives	back	at	the	point	which	I	critique	in	Volf’s	 argument,	 the	 assumption	 that	 Jews	 and	 Christians	must	 be	 understood	 to	worship	 the	same	 God;	 he	 highlights	 the	 writings	 of	 John	 of	 Damascus	 as	 an	 example	 of	 early	 Medieval	Christian	theology	which	rejected	this	assumption,	although	it	is	not	clear	to	me	that	the	charge	of	 heresy	 (incorrect	 belief)	 John	 levels	 against	 Jewish	 monotheism	 is	 quite	 the	 same	 as	 the	worship	of	a	false	god;	John	is	not	a	Marcionite.		
programme	 of	 any	 kind.	 The	 framing	 of	 religion	 as	 a	 set	 of	 data	 for	understanding	 human	 behaviour,	 rather	 than	 as	 an	 element	 constitutive	 of	 a	cultural	 system	 which	 scholars	 of	 religion	 are	 necessarily	 participants	 in	 and	inheritors	of,	is	founded	on	the	historically	progressivist	secularization	narrative,	which	assumes	not	only	 the	 separability	of	 religion	 from	culture	 (or	of	 culture	from	 experience),	 but	 that	 such	 a	 separation	 is	 ultimately	 desirable.	 It	 is	replicating	 the	 view-from-nowhere	 criticised	 as	 an	 epistemological	 framework	by	Sandra	Harding	and	Donna	Harroway,	and	as	a	basis	for	politics	by	Talal	Asad,	among	others.16			Harding	 and	 Harroway’s	 critique	 of	 the	 view	 from	 nowhere,	 and	 subsequent	development	 of	 standpoint	 epistemology,	 insists	 on	 the	 particular	 social,	cultural,	 and	 embodied	 situatedness	 of	 each	 knower	 as	 the	 foundation	 upon	which	 knowledge	 is	 constructed,	 and	 names	 the	 denial	 of	 this	 situatedness	 as,	itself,	 an	 ideological	 position	 deeply	 implicated	 in	 imperialist	 practices.	 It	 is	important	to	note	that,	in	spite	of	critiques	linking	it	to	postmodern	relativism	in	which	 everything	 is	 contingent	 and	 constructed	 and	 thus	 cannot	 be	 known	because	 it	never	properly	existed,	 standpoint	epistemology	 is	not	necessarily	a	denial	of	the	existence	of	an	objective	truth	or	a	“real”	object	of	study,	but	rather	a	denial	 of	 the	 capability	 for	 any	one	 individual	 viewpoint	 to	 fully	 encapsulate	and	understand	its	object.	Asad’s	critique	of	secularism	details	the	way	that	the	faux-neutral	ideological	position	operates	specifically	in	discourse	about	religion,	obscuring	 the	degree	 to	which	 “secular”	European	 culture	has	been	 shaped	by	religious	 (and	 particularly	 Christian)	 influences	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	emphasising	 the	 distinctive	 role	 of	 religion	 in	 (and	 therefore	 the	 religious	otherness	of)	non-Christian,	non-European	cultures.			The	assumption	of	secularism	as	 the	privileged	epistemological	position	within	the	study	of	religion	is	thus	particularly	detrimental	for	non-Christian	scholars	of	non-Christian	traditions,	who	find	that	the	only	academically	acceptable	way	to	approach	 the	 study	 of	 their	 own	 culture	 is	 as	methodological	 outsiders.17	 This																																																									16	See	Sandra	Harding,	 ‘Rethinking	Standpoint	Epistemology:	What	 Is	“Strong	Objectivity”?’	The	
Feminist	 Standpoint	 Theory	 Reader:	 Intellectual	 &	 Political	 Controversies,	 ed.	 Sandra	 Harding	(New	York	and	London:	Routledge,	2004)	127–40;	Donna	Haraway,	 ‘Situated	Knowledges:	The	Science	Question	 in	Feminism	and	the	Privilege	of	Partial	Perspective’,	The	Feminist	Standpoint	
Theory	 Reader,	 81–101;	 Talal	 Asad,	 Formations	 of	 the	 Secular:	 Christianity,	 Islam,	 Modernity	(Stanford:	Stanford	UP,	2003)	pp.	12-17.	17	 For	 an	 example	 of	 the	 way	 that	 practitioners	 within	 academic	 theology	 view	 non-Christian	religions,	see	the	recent	“state	of	the	discipline”	piece	by	Catherine	Pickstock,	‘The	Confidence	of	Theology:	 Frontiers	 of	 Christianity	 in	Britain	Today’	 ABC	 [Australia	 Broadcasting	 Corporation]	Religion	 and	 Ethics,	 15	 April	 2016,	http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2016/04/15/4444059.htm	 While	 Pickstock	 situates	theology	 as	 a	 discipline	 in	 multi-layered	 dialogue,	 and	 admits	 that	 non-Christian	 theological	perspectives	 exist,	 she	 does	 assume	 that	 academic	 theology	 is	 academic	 Christian	 theology.	Religious	studies	seems	the	ground	where	various	spiritual	discourses	may	meet,	but	Pickstock,	when	she	notes	that	a	 ‘sense	of	shared	wayfaring	might	indeed	offer	a	useful	guiding	image	for	the	Church's	relation	with	academic	theology,	and	engagement	with	other	discourses	and	faiths,	including	 absence	 of	 faith’	 continues	 to	 differentiate	 between	 academic	 theology,	 which	 is	connected	 to	 Christianity,	 and	 other	 discourses,	 connected	 to	 other	 faiths	 or	 none.	 See	 also	Maurice	Wiles,	What	 is	 Theology?	 (Oxford:	 OUP,	 1976)	 10-3,	 which	 discusses	 the	 relationship	between	 Christian	 theology,	 other	 religions,	 and	 religious	 studies;	 while	 there	 is	 a	 call	 for	empathy	and	breadth	of	understanding,	non-Christian	 theology	 is	never	mentioned,	so	 that	 the	
impoverishes	 the	 broad	 field	 of	 theology	 and	 religious	 studies,	 as	 it	 prevents	critical-constructive	scholarship	of	non-Christian	religions	from	entering	into	the	academic	conversation,	and	thus	ensures	that	knowledge	of	these	traditions	will	remain,	relative	to	knowledge	of	Christianity,	limited,	partial,	and	fragmented.			This	 is	 a	 reasonably	 compelling	 argument	 for	why	 non-Christian	 communities	should	 encourage	 critical-constructive	 insider	 scholarship	 of	 their	 own	traditions	 (although	 the	 issues	 of	 academic	 legitimacy	 at	 the	 core	 of	 this	argument	 also	 explain,	 in	 part,	 why	 this	 does	 not	 happen	 with	 any	 great	frequency),	 or	 why	 scholars	 from	 those	 traditions	 might	 be	 doing	 the	 wider	academic	 community	 a	 service	 by	 taking	 upon	 themselves	 the	 very	 real	professional	 risk	 of	 breaking	 from	 the	 methodological	 orthodoxy	 of	 religious	studies.	 It	 does	 not	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 why	 established	 departments	 of	theology,	 which	 have	 historically	 been	 dedicated	 entirely	 to	 the	 study	 of	Christian	 traditions,	 should	 be	welcoming	 to	 such	 scholars,	 or	why	 such	 study	should	 have	 a	 place	 on	 the	 curriculum	 even	 in	 places	 where	 there	 is	 not	 a	significant	 non-Christian	 population.	 This	 is	 the	 argument	 to	 which	 the	remainder	 of	 this	 paper	 will	 devote	 itself,	 beginning	 by	 addressing	 Altman’s	objection	that	it	is	impossible	to	apply	properly	empirical	methods	to	the	task	of	“describing	God”.		IV.		The	assumption	that	theology	is	“describing	God”	is	both	etymologically	accurate	and,	 at	 least	 since	 Schleiermacher,	 deeply	 inadequate	 as	 a	 description	 of	 the	actual	 content	 of	 the	 discipline.	 The	 American	 Emerging	 Church	 theologian	Phyllis	Tickle’s	re-translation	of	the	Greek	roots	as	“God-talk”	comes	somewhat	closer	 to	 an	 accurate	 summary	 of	 the	 discipline’s	 concerns:	 it	 is	 true	 that	 the	material	with	which	theologians	work	is	discourse	about	God.	It	is	also	true	that	discourse	about	God	is	not	the	sole	province	of	Christianity.	Other	religions	also	have	long	traditions	of	such	discourse.			Here,	 I	will	 shift	 from	speaking	broadly	of	non-Christian	religions	and	begin	 to	draw	examples	specifically	from	Judaism,	in	order	to	become	more	precise	in	my	argument	and	to	address	some	particular	objections	that	might	be	raised	to	the	idea	 of	 Jewish	 theology.	 Judaism	 has	 a	 long	 tradition	 of	 discourse	 about	 the	nature	 of	 God	 which	 exists	 in	 tension	 with	 its	 long	 tradition	 of	 prohibition	against	speculation	concerning	the	nature	of	God.	Very	often	this	latter	tradition	is	 cited	 by	 Christian	 theologians	 as	 a	 justification	 for	 the	 exclusion	 of	 Jewish																																																																																																																																																															implication	is	that	the	assumed	place	for	other	religions	 in	the	university	 is	comparative	study.	Similarly,	Colin	E.	Gunton,	‘Doing	Theology	in	the	University	Today’	in	Colin	E.	Gunton,	Stephen	R.	Holmes,	 and	Murray	A.	 Rae,	 eds.,	The	Practice	 of	 Theology	 (London:	 SCM	Press,	 2001)	 441-55,	discusses	the	increasing	number	of	students	in	theology	departments	who	are	unbelievers	or	at	least	 not	 committed	 Christians	 but	 never	 the	 idea	 of	 adherents	 to	 other	 faiths	 studying	 the	discipline.	One	exception	to	this	is	David	F.	Ford	who,	in	The	Future	of	Christian	Theology	(Malden,	MA,	and	Oxford:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2011)	161,	includes	within	theology	that	is	available	to	be	taught	within	the	 university	 all	 ‘tradition-specific’	 forms	 of	 religious	 thought.	 However,	 the	 paradigm	 of	theology	 which	 he	 envisions	 in	 the	 book	 as	 a	 whole	 is	 entirely	 Christian,	 using	 Christian	terminology	and	understanding	of	sources.	
thought	 from	 the	 canon	 of	 theology,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	would	 be	 unjust—colonising,	 even—to	 read	 Jewish	 texts	 as	 theology	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 expressed	resistance	 of	 the	 Jewish	 tradition	 to	 that	 reading.18	 	 The	 deployment	 of	 this	objection	is,	in	light	of	the	way	Jewish	prophetic	texts	have	been,	and	continue	to	be,	used	by	Christian	theologians,	quite	frankly	adorable.19																																																										18	While	Christian	theologians	rarely	cite	examples	of	 Jewish	resistance	to	the	term	theology	as	arguments	 against	 allowing	 Jews	 to	 participate	 in	 theology	 in	 their	 own	way,	 the	 resistance	 is	noted	even	by	 those	who	are	known	to	 turn	 to	 Jewish	 thinkers	 for	 theological	source	material.	For	 instance,	 Dorothee	 Sölle,	 Thinking	 about	 God:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 Theology	 (London:	 SCM;	Philadelphia:	Trinity	Press	International,	1990)	2	writes:	‘Many	years	ago,	when	 I	was	 teaching	 religion,	 I	 once	visited	Martin	Buber	 in	 Jerusalem.	 I	had	thought	of	myself	as	a	 theologian,	as	a	 teacher.	He	 looked	at	me	 for	a	 long	time	and	eventually	said:	 ‘Theology—how	do	you	do	that?’	At	that	point	I	understood	for	the	first	time	the	depth	of	the	difference	between	Hebrew	and	Greek	thought:	how	can	one	grasp	the	experience	with	God	of	 which	 the	 people	 in	 the	 Bible	 tell—that	 God	 encounters	 them,	 challenges	 them,	 requires	something	of	 them,	 gives	 something	 to	 them,	 refuses	 them?	How	can	one	 grasp	 this	 living	but	many-sided	 experience	 in	 a	 system	 with	 the	 help	 go	 technical	 terms	 and	 logic?	 Certainly	 the	Hebrew	Bible	contains	an	 implicit	understanding	of	 the	existence	of	human	beings	before	God.	But	this	understanding	is	seldom	the	object	of	systematic	theological	reflection.’	In	 this,	 she	makes	 explicit	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 great	 difference	 between	 the	Hellenistic	 philosophical	tradition	 seen	 to	 be	 at	 the	 roots	 of	most	European	 theology	 and	Hebrew	 thought,	 a	 difference	later	 taken	 up	 by	 fellow	 progressive	 theologians	 such	 as	 John	 Douglas	 Hall.		It	 is	 more	 common	 to	 find	 statements	 about	 the	 non-existence	 of	 Jewish	 theology	 in	 souces	written	 by	 Jewish	 authors.	 Judith	 Plaskow,	 in	 Hava	 Tirosh-Samuelson	 and	 Aaron	 W.	 Hughes,	‘Interview	 with	 Judtith	 Plaskow,’	 Judith	 Plaskow:	 Feminism,	 Theology,	 and	 Justice,	 eds.	 Hava	Tirosh-Samuelson	 and	Aaron	W.	Hughes	 (Leiden:	 Brill,	 2014)	 97-138,	 103,	 states	 that	 she	 has	been	 told	 there	 is	 no	 such	 thing;	 Cass	 Fisher,	Contemplative	Nation:	 A	 Philosophical	 Account	 of	
Jewish	Theological	Language	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2012)	notes	an	argument	that	the	 division	 of	 Jewish	 Studies	 into	 focused	 specializations	 means	 that	 one	 cannot	 speak	 of	"Jewish	 theology";	 Neil	 Gillman,	 ‘Theology	 in	 Contemporary	 Judaism’,	The	 Blackwell	 Reader	 in	
Judaism,	 eds.	 Jacob	 Neusner	 and	 Alan	 J.	 Avery-Peck	 (Oxford:	 Blackwell,	 2001)	 363-77,	 363,	declares	 that	 ‘Theology,	 it	 has	 often	 been	maintained,	 does	 not	 come	 intuitively	 to	 Jews	 or	 to	Judaism.’	Other	Jewish	writers	approach	the	issue	by	arguing	that	Jewish	theology	has	not	been	recognised	as	theology	not	because	it	does	not	exist	but	because	it	has	taken	a	different	form	than	most	of	what	 Christianity	 or	 Islam	 thinks	 of	 as	 theology:	 where	 Christian	 and	 Islamic	 theology	 is	propositional	 and	 logic-based,	 taking	 its	 cue	 from	 Hellenistic	 philosophy,	 Jewish	 theology	 is	traditionally	 "exegetical"	or	 "hermeneutical"--see	 Jacob	Neusner	 in	Neusner	and	Bruce	Chilton,	
Jewish-Christian	 Debates:	 God,	 Kingdom,	 Messiah	 (Minneapolis:	 Fortress	 Press,	 1998)	 20--or	unsystematic	 and	 "experimental"--see	 Bernard	 J.	 Bamberger,	 The	 Search	 for	 Jewish	 Theology	(New	York:	Behrman	House,	1978)	2-3.		19	This	is	most	notable,	at	least	among	mainline	church	traditions	(Catholic,	Anglican,	Methodist,	Lutheran,	Reformed)	 in	ecumenical	 liturgical	uses	of	 “Old	Testament”	 texts,	particularly	during	seasons	such	as	Advent	and	Lent,	when	nuanced	readings	very	often	give	way	to	interpreting	the	texts	as	straightforwardly	foretelling	events	in	the	life	of	Jesus.	Reading	 cycles,	 such	 as	 the	 three-year	 cycle	 of	 the	Revised	Common	Lectionary	 (RCL)	used	or	recommended	 for	 use	 by	 most	 anglophone	 mainline	 denominations,	 match	 seasonal	 Gospel	readings	with	Old	Testament	readings	by	theme.	For	example,	on	the	Sunday	before	Christmas,	depending	 on	 the	 year,	 churchgoers	 will	 hear	 Isaiah	 7:10-16	 on	 the	 sign	 of	 a	 young	 woman	bearing	a	son	to	be	called	Immanuel,	2	Samuel	7:1-11,	16	about	David’s	throne	being	established	forever,	 or	Micah	 5:2-5a	 prophesying	 that	 a	 ruler	will	 come	 from	Bethlehem.	Members	 of	 the	Consultation	on	Common	Texts,	the	group	which	produced	the	RCL,	admit	that	one	of	their	major	concerns	was	figuring	out	how	to	handle	the	Old	Testament.	They	note	that	it	would	be	an	‘error,	in	the	estimation	of	many,	[...]	to	read	it	only	as	a	kind	of	completed	or	fulfilled	prophecy	which	has	been	“superseded”	by	the	New	Testament	Church	and	its	writings,	rather	than	reading	and	exegeting	 it	 as	 Scripture	 in	 its	 own	 right,	 rite,	 and	 historical	 context.	 However	 it	 is	 surely	 not	theologically	permissible	to	read	the	Old	Testament	at	eucharistic	worship,	or	Christian	worship	
	When,	 for	 example,	 the	 Talmudic	 prohibition	 against	 speculation	 on	 “what	 is	above,	 what	 is	 beneath,	 what	 is	 before,	 what	 after”	 (Chagigah	 11b),	 or	Maimonides’	arguments	against	anthropomorphising	the	deity,	are	prioritised	as	representations	 of	 “the	 Jewish	 tradition”	 over	 and	 against,	 for	 example,	 the	image	of	God	laughing	in	delight	at	the	Talmud	Rabbis’	overturning	of	a	heavenly	decree	 in	Baba	Mezi’a	59b,	or	 the	extended	argument	concerning	 the	nature	of	God	 which	 forms	 the	 backdrop	 for	 Maimonides’	 arguments	 against	anthropomorphism,20	what	is	actually	happening	is	not	a	simple	reflection	of	the	role	 of	 theology	 in	 Jewish	 tradition,	 but	 a	 judgement	 about	 what	 the	 Jewish	tradition	 ought	 to	 be;	 it	 ignores	 both	 historical	 evidence	 of	 Jews	 engaging	 in	things-like-theology	and	a	substantial	body	of	contemporary	work	which	labels	itself	explicitly	as	theology.			This	judgement	is	often	buttressed	by	an	expressed	resistance	to	the	specific	use	of	 the	 term	 theology	 (rather	 than	 to	 activities	which	may	be	 reasonably	 called	theology)	which	appears	in	a	number	of	Jewish	texts;21	this	resistance	is	typically	founded	upon	 an	understanding	of	 theology	 as	 a	 specifically	Christian	 concern	with	 describing	 the	 incarnation.22	While	 arguments	 founded	 on	 this	 resistance	are	not	frivolous	per	se,	they	are	prescribing	an	exclusive	focus	on	one	particular	aspect	of	the	work	of	Christian	theology	over	all	others—obviously	an	important	aspect,	 to	 be	 sure,	 but	 not	 actually	 the	 only	 concern	which	 Christian	 theology	addresses.		A	 similar	 set	 of	 issues	 emerges	 if	 we	 take,	 as	 our	 point	 of	 departure,	 the	Anselmian	definition	of	theology	as	“faith	seeking	understanding”;	we	might,	by	that	 route,	 introduce	 some	 debate	 over	 the	 concept	 of	 “faith”,	 and	 whether	 it	implicitly	prioritises	belief	over	praxis,	and	from	there	go	on	to	a	consideration	of	whether	Judaism	is	primarily	a	religion	of	belief	or	practice,	which	is	an	essay																																																																																																																																																															in	 general,	 as	 though	 there	were	no	 linkage	with	Christian	belief	 and	prayer’	 (Consultation	 on	Common	Texts,	The	Revised	Common	Lectionary	(Nashville:	Abingdon,	1992)	17).	In	the	end	they	compromised	by	having	two	optional	Old	Testament	readings	for	most	Sundays	between	the	end	of	the	Easter	season	and	the	beginning	of	Advent,	one	being	semi-continuous	from	week	to	week	and	the	other	connecting	specifically	to	themes	encountered	in	the	Gospel	reading.	But	Advent,	Christmas,	 Epiphany,	 Lent,	 and	 Easter	 remain	 thematic;	 and	 while	 the	 producers	 of	 the	 RCL	worried	about	 supersessionist	 readings,	 interpreters	of	 the	given	 texts	 in	 church	pulpits	might	not—and	many	traditional	hymns	connected	to	seasons	of	the	church	year	also	show	few	qualms	about	presenting	Old	Testament	texts	as	pointing	directly	to	Christ’s	story.	20	See	Guide	for	the	Perplexed	I:1-20.	21	 In	 addition	 to	Neusner	 and	 Bamberger,	 cited	 above,	 see	 Shubert	 Spero,	New	 Perspectives	 in	
Theology	of	Judaism	(Boston:	Academic	Studies	Press,	2013)	26,	which	summarises	the	argument	that	Jewish	thought	about	God	is	not	recognised	as	theology	because	of	its	difference	from	Greek	modes	of	thinking.	Also	see	Norbert	M.	Samuelson,	Jewish	Philosophy:	An	Historical	Introduction	(London;	New	York:	Continuum,	2003)	113,	‘rabbinic	theology	(i.e.	philosophy	about	God)’.	22	This	restrictive	understanding	of	theology	is	undergirded	by	those	Christian	theologians	who	assume	that	the	proper	environment	of	theology	is	a	community	of	faith--by	which	they	mean	the	church.	 See	 for	 example	 the	work	 of	 Stanley	Hauerwas,	who	 has	written	 ‘Theologians	 at	 least	have	 the	 advantage	 [over	 most	 academics]	 that,	 though	 we	 often	 end	 up	 writing	 for	 other	academic	theologians,	we	are	at	least	committed	to	write	for	people	who	identify	themselves	as	Christians	 (The	Work	 of	 Theology	 (Grand	Rapids,	MI:	Wm.	B.	 Eerdmans,	 2015)	20-1).	Not	 only	does	this	underline	an	idea	that	theology	is	a	Christian	discipline,	but	also	that	it	is	primarily	for	Christians.	
title	I	set	for	my	first	year	students.	Since	this	is	not	first	year	Judaism,	however,	I	am	 content	 to	 skip	 straight	 ahead	 to	 the	 answer:	 it’s	 both,	 and	 different	traditions	within	 Judaism	draw	different	 conclusions	 about	 the	 priority	 of	 one	over	 the	 other,	 just	 as	 different	 strands	 of	 Christian	 tradition	 have	 developed	different	approaches	to	the	vexed	question	of	faith	versus	works.	This	approach	does	 not,	 therefore,	 do	 much	 to	 advance	 my	 specific	 argument	 about	 the	potentials	 of	 non-Christian	 theology,	 and	 nor	 do	 I	 expect	 it	would	 do	much	 to	pacify	a	critic	of	the	academic	value	of	theology	in	general,	such	as	Altman,	due	to	the	 construction’s	 implicit	 presumption	 that	 faith	 is	 the	 ground	 upon	 which	understanding	 rests	 (a	 presumption	 enforced	 by	 Anselm’s	 other	 famously	quotable	maxim,	credo	ut	intelligam).		The	 case	 for	 theology	 as	 an	 academic	 discipline	 is	 helped	 much	 more	 by	 a	consideration	 of	 its	methods	 and	 its	 proximate,	 rather	 than	 ultimate,	 object	 of	study.	 By	 this	 understanding,	 the	 material	 with	 which	 theologians	 work	 is,	indeed,	discourse	about	God	(or,	more	broadly,	discourses	of	faith),	but	the	focus	is	on	the	discourse	 itself,	as	an	artefact	of	cultural	significance	regardless	of	 its	truth	value,	 rather	 than	on	 the	object	of	 that	discourse.	There	are	 two	ways	of	pursuing	 this	 framing	 of	 the	 discipline,	 which	 I	 will	 consider	 in	 turn:	 first,	 a	textual	approach,	and	second,	a	methodological	approach.		The	 textual	 approach	 sees	 the	 field	of	 theology	as	 something	akin	 to	 a	 literary	canon,	a	set	of	related	texts,	and	the	work	of	theology	as	the	interpretation	and	possibly	the	expansion	of	that	canon.	Much	as	in	the	case	of	literary	canons,	there	is	 room	 for	 debate	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 the	 theological	 canon,	 and	 the	questions	are	roughly	similar:	ought	canon	to	be	understood	prescriptively,	as	an	artefact	 invested	 with	 authority	 by	 means	 of	 the	 historical	 process	 which	brought	 it	 into	 being,	 and	 bounded	 by	 fiat,	 or	 descriptively,	 as	 a	 collection	 of	texts	 whose	 authority	 has	 accrued	 through	 the	 cultural	 process	 of	 repeated	citation,	and	not	bounded	so	much	as	defined	by	the	interrelationships	between	its	 constitutive	 texts?	 In	 reality,	 these	 positions	 operate	 as	 points	 on	 a	continuum,	 and	 the	 disciplinary	 boundaries	 of	 academic	 theology	 are	somewhere	 in	 the	 middle—I	 believe	 that	 most	 readers	 of	 this	 article	 would	agree,	for	example,	that	the	writings	of	Karl	Barth	belong	in	a	theological	canon	(whether	 or	 not	 they	 occupy	 a	 central	 position	 in	 our	 own	 preferred	 canons),	and	 from	that	agreement	we	can	derive	evidence	 that	 the	canon	has	expanded	within	the	past	century;	however	restrictively	we	may	wish	to	define	it,	it	is	not	closed.23		The	 place	 of	 Jewish	 thought	within	 the	 canon	 of	 theology	 is	 highly	 dependent	upon	the	degree	to	which	the	canon	is	conceived	of	as	open,	although	it	does	not	follow	from	this	that	the	ability	of	a	Jew	to	“do	theology”	is	similarly	dependent;	the	more	 closed	 the	 theological	 canon,	 the	more	 “doing	 theology”	 becomes	 an	exercise	 in	commenting	upon,	rather	 than	adding	 to,	and	the	 less	controversial	contributions	from	non-Christians	become.	Anyone	can	comment	on	a	text,	after	all.	Whether	that	commentary	is	useful	to	others	depends	on	a	number	of	factors,																																																									23	 A	 much	 longer	 discussion	 of	 my	 own	 understanding	 of	 canon	 formation	 can	 be	 found	 in	Vincent,	Culture,	 Communion	 and	Recovery:	 Tolkienian	 Fairy-Story	 and	 Inter-Religious	 Exchange	(Newcastle	upon	Tyne:	Cambridge	Scholars	Press,	2016)	pp.	17-21.	
not	 least	 of	 which	 is	 the	 particular	 “others”	 who	 constitute	 the	 commentary’s	assumed	audience.	The	enterprise	of	Jewish	New	Testament	Studies,	to	draw	an	example	from	a	closely	allied	discipline,	presents	itself	both	as	mining	the	texts	of	the	New	Testament	for	insight	into	Jewish	history,	and	as	bringing	knowledge	of	later	developments	in	Rabbinic	Judaism	to	bear	on	particular	problems	in	New	Testament	exegesis.	24		By	 contrast,	 in	 an	 open	 canon,	 to	 “do	 theology”	 is	 not	 commentary	 but	contribution,	a	deliberate	augmentation	of	the	existing	canon,	and	the	extent	to	which	 a	 text	 by	 a	 Jewish	 author	 stands	 in	 a	 useful	 relationship	 to	 the	 existing	theological	canon	depends,	in	the	first	instance,	upon	precisely	how	that	existing	canon	is	conceived	of:	here,	the	heritage	of	theology	as	an	historically	Christian	discipline	comes	into	play.	Even	leaving	aside	the	vexed	issue	of	the	ownership	of	 Hebrew	 Scripture,	 it	 is	 relatively	 uncontroversial	 to	 note	 that	 Aquinas’s	thought	on	a	number	of	metaphysical	issues	owes	a	great	deal	to	Islamic	thinkers	such	 as	 Avicenna,	 or	 that	 Jewish	 thinkers	 such	 as	 Levinas	 have	 been	tremendously	influential	upon	twentieth	century	theology.25	More	controversial	is	 the	question	of	how	such	 sources	 are	 received:	 are	 they	being	 read	 into	 the	canon	as	theological	 in	their	own	right,	or	are	they	being	used	as	data	which	is	auxiliary	 to	 the	 work	 of	 theology	 proper?	 This	 is	 itself	 a	 complex	 and	 vexed	argument,	which	I	will	not	be	able	to	pursue	fully	here,	but	clearly	if	the	canon	of	theology	has	previously	included	non-Christian	sources,	it	may	do	so	again.	If,	by	contrast,	we	view	these	earlier	works	as	mere	data	which	supplements,	but	does	not	 expand,	 the	 field	 of	 theology,	 then	 it	 is	 more	 difficult	 for	 future	 works	 to	claim	their	own	place	in	the	canon.			I	have	been,	for	the	sake	of	simplicity,	talking	about	a	single	theological	canon;	a	more	accurate	mapping	of	the	discipline	might	reasonably	find	it	to	encompass	multiple	intersecting	canons,	where	works	that	are	central	to	one	are	marginal	to	another—Aquinas	and	Barth	remain	apt	examples,	here.	Even	if	texts	produced	by	Jews	cannot	be	understood	as	central,	or	even	firmly	located	within,	various	canons	of	Christian	 theology,	 it	 is	 still	meaningful	 to	 speak	of	 canons	of	 Jewish	theology	which	may	 usefully	 be	 read	 and	 commented	 on	 by	 non-Jews,	 just	 as	non-Christians	 may	 usefully	 read	 and	 comment	 upon	 canons	 of	 Christian	theology—but	 there	 is	 a	 distinction	 to	 be	 drawn	 here	 between	 “studying”	 or	“reading”	theology	and	“doing”	theology,	which	is	best	understood	by	turning	to	a	discussion	of	theology	as	methodology.		
																																																								24	See	“The	Editors’	Preface”	 in	The	 Jewish	Annotated	New	Testament,	ed.	A.	 J.	Levine	&	Mark	Z.	Brettler,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011)	xi-xii.		25	 See,	 e.g.,	 Andrew	 Root,	 “Practical	 Theology	 as	 Social	 Ethical	 Action	 in	 Christian	 Ministry:	Implications	from	Emmanuel	Levinas	and	Dietrich	Bonhoeffer”	International	Journal	of	Practical	
Theology	10.1	(2006)	pp.	53-75;	Stephen	H.	Webb,	“The	Rhetoric	of	Ethics	as	Excess:	A	Christian	Theological	 Response	 to	 Emmanuel	 Levinas”	Modern	 Theology	 15.1	 (1999)	 pp.	 1-16;	 Michael	Purcell,	Levinas	and	Theology	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2006);	Jeffrey	L.	Kolsky,	Levinas	and	
the	Philosophy	of	Religion	(Indiana	University	Press,	2001);		Graham	Ward,	The	Postmodern	God:	
A	 Theological	 Reader	 (Blackwell,	 1997);	 Phillip	 Blond,	 ed.,	 Post-Secular	 Philosophy:	 Between	
Philosophy	and	Theology	 (Routledge,	1997),	especially	 the	contributions	 from	Phillip	Blond	and	Kevin	Hart.	
As	in	the	case	of	canonicity,	there	have	been	many	books,	and	much	controversy,	over	how	best	 to	describe	 (or	prescribe)	 theological	method,	and	here	 I	 find	 it	increasingly	difficult	 to	 speak	 in	general	 terms,	without	accidentally	preferring	one	 over	 another.26	 I	 am	 too	 conscious	 of	 my	 own	 training,	 which	 prioritised	hermeneutics	and	the	Wesleyan	quadrilateral	of	scripture,	tradition,	reason,	and	experience—although	when	I	taught	at	Glasgow,	the	local	tradition	was	to	add	a	fifth	 source	 of	 theology,	 imagination,	 an	 addition	 I	 find	 extremely	 constructive	and	which	I	have	retained	in	my	teaching	and	writing	since.	I	find	categorisations	such	 as	 Christology,	 Pneumatology,	 Ecclesiology,	 etc.,	 occasionally	 helpful	 for	narrowing	 down	 the	 best	 way	 to	 frame	 a	 particular	 line	 of	 enquiry	 and	 for	identifying	 potentially	 helpful	 interlocutors,	 but	 shy	 away	 from	 approaches	which	require	that	an	enquiry	be	assigned	an	appropriate	categorical	 label	and	restricted	 in	 scope	 to	 material	 which	 bears	 the	 same	 label	 in	 order	 to	 be	considered	 rigorously	 theological.	 So	 my	 strong	 inclination	 is	 to	 describe	theology	as	method	as	a	practice	of	reading	texts	from	a	particular	tradition	with	a	 view	 to	 understanding	 those	 texts	 both	 in	 their	 historical	 context	 and	 as	somehow	relevant	to	contemporary	concerns,	and	I	believe	a	close	inspection	of	the	 various	 books	 written	 on	 theological	 method	 would	 reveal	 a	 host	 of	strategies	 (and	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 dispute	 over	 prioritisation)	 for	accomplishing	precisely	this	core	task.27			That	being	said,	 I	am	aware	 that	my	preference	 for	historical	 contextualisation	may	itself	be	controversial;	it	would	be	unlikely	to	convince	those	committed,	for	example,	to	understanding	doctrine	as	the	expression	of	eternal	truths,28	though	even	in	such	a	case	I	would	hope	that	some	agreement	might	be	reached	on	the	fact	 that	 even	 eternal	 truths	 must	 necessarily	 find	 expression	 in	 concrete	historical	moments.	Certainly,	the	trend	in	papers	delivered	in	theology	sessions	at	 the	 American	 Academy	 of	 Religion	 suggests	 that,	 in	 practice,	 historical	contextualisation	 has	 become	 a	 disciplinary	 norm.29	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the																																																									26	 See,	 e.g.,	 Elaine	 Graham,	 Heather	Walton	 and	 Frances	Ward	Theological	 Reflection:	 Methods	(SCM	Press,	2005);	Colin	E.	Gunton,	Stephen	R.	Holmes,	and	Murray	A.	Rae,	eds.,	The	Practice	of	
Theology	(London:	SCM	Press,	2001);	Rachel	Muers	and	Mike	Higton,	Modern	Theology:	A	Critical	
Introduction	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	2012).	27	 See,	 e.g.,	 Dorothee	 Sölle,	 Thinking	 about	 God:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 Theology	 (London:	 SCM;	Philadelphia:	Trinity	Press	International,	1990),	p.	3:	“Three	elements	which	govern	systematic	theology	can	be	recognised	in	these	preliminary	reflections.	The	task	of	systematic	theology	is	to	identify	these	three	elements	and	at	the	same	time	to	relate	them	to	one	another.	The	elements	are:	Scripture	and	tradition,	or:	the	text;	the	historical	situation	of	the	text	and	its	interpreters,	or:	the	context;	the	community	of	believers,	or:	the	people	of	God.”	28	 See	 Christine	 Helmer,	Theology	 and	 the	 End	 of	 Doctrine	 (Louisville:	Westminster	 John	 Knox	Press,	2014)	for	one	account	of	the	development	of	this	understanding	of	doctrine	as	a	dominant	strand	of	modern	Christian	theology.	29	 Taking	 2014	 (the	 conference	 immediately	 preceding	 the	 eruption	 of	 the	 nominations	controversy,	whose	contents	would	have	been	knowable	by	all	parties	involved)	as	an	example,	it	is	 true	that	 the	 titles	of	many	of	 the	papers	 in	 the	Christian	Systematic	Theology	Section	might	raise	 the	 eyebrows	 of	 scholars	 committed	 to	 entirely	 descriptive	 practice,	 papers	 focussed	 on	historical	 contextualisation	of	particular	 ideas	were	delivered	 in	groups	such	as	Augustine	and	Augustinianisms;	Bonhoeffer:	Theology	and	Social	Analysis;	Comparative	Theology;	Evangelical	Studies;	 Kierkegaard,	 Religion,	 and	 Culture;	 Liberal	 Theologies;	 Martin	 Luther	 and	 Global	Lutheran	Traditions;	Nineteenth	Century	Theology.	While	Christian	Systematic	Theology	is	by	far	
admission	 of	 the	 category	 of	 eternal	 truths	 as	 a	 valid	 (albeit	 not	 necessarily	universal)	concern	of	theological	method	is	quite	likely	to	enforce	the	suspicion	with	 which	 theology	 is	 viewed	 by	 scholars	 committed	 to	 a	 purely	 secular	religious	studies	methodology.		V.		The	 reason	 that	 I	 keep	 returning	 to	 the	 case	 made	 by	 critics	 of	 theology’s	academic	 value	 is	 that	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 academic	 study	 of	 religion	 in	general	is	poor.	Departments	are	closing	and	consolidating,	student	numbers	are	dropping,	research	funding	is	evaporating.	The	field	received	a	boost	in	the	early	years	of	this	century	when	understanding	Islam	seemed	to	be	an	urgent	national	security	concern,	at	least	in	English-speaking	nations	such	as	the	US,	UK,	Canada,	and	 Australia,	 and	 we	 are	 still	 feeling	 some	 after-effects	 of	 that.	 Religion	 and	conflict	tends	to	do	quite	well,	 in	terms	of	student	recruitment,	book	sales,	and	funding	capture—but	this	is	an	anomaly	in	the	wider	landscape	of	theology	and	religious	 studies.30	 That	 landscape,	 especially	 in	 Europe,	 is	 increasingly	dominated	by	the	secularist	assumptions	articulated	by	McCutcheon	and	Altman:	religious	 belief	 is,	 at	 best,	 a	 private	 concern	 and	 at	 worst	 a	 threat	 to	 social	cohesion;	if	people	want	to	be	religious	let	them	do	it	on	their	own	time,	not	in	a	state-funded	university,	whose	work	should	be	oriented	towards	understanding	and	counteracting	the	threat	posed	by	religion;	if	religious	organisations	want	to	sponsor	research	or	teach	people	about	their	faith	then	let	them	fund	their	own	institutions;	this	is	not	a	matter	for	academic	inquiry.	So	part	of	my	argument	for	the	value	of	including	non-Christian	religions	within	the	disciplinary	umbrella	of	theology	is	that	doing	so	paves	the	way	for	a	viable	alternative	to	the	secularised,	study-of-religion-as-a-strange-artefact-of-human-behaviour	 that	 is	 becoming	dominant	in	public	institutions.	The	other	part	of	my	argument	is	that	including	critical-constructive	 scholarship	 of	 non-Christian	 traditions	 in	 theological	conversations	will	actually	improve	the	way	that	we	all	do	theology.		Given,	 then,	 an	 understanding	 of	 theology	 as	 a	 method	 of	 reading	 texts	concerned	with	God	or	belief	more	generally,	with	attention	both	to	their	place	within	 a	 particular	 tradition	 of	 thought	 about	 God	 or	 belief	 and	 to	 their	implications	 within	 the	 reader’s	 own	 world,	 there	 appear	 to	 be	 few,	 if	 any,	supportable	 arguments	 for	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 a	 discipline	 that	 ought	 to	 be	restricted	to	the	study	of	Christianity	by	Christians—aside	from	inertia,	which	I	use	 in	 a	 technical	 and	not	 a	 pejorative	 sense:	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 arguments	 I	 have																																																																																																																																																															the	largest	single	theology-focussed	group	in	the	AAR,	the	papers	presented	at	the	other	groups	combined	comprise	by	far	a	majority	of	theology	papers	presented	at	the	annual	meeting.	30	 This	 assertion	 is,	 admittedly,	 based	 largely	 on	 anecdotal	 data,	 drawn	 from	 observation	 of	shifting	student	interests	in	the	institutions	where	I	have	taught	over	the	past	ten	years,	together	with	 some	 fairly	 broad	 analysis	 of	 recruitment	 trends.	 For	 Canada	 and	 the	 United	 States,	 the	Association	 of	 Theological	 Schools	 records	 extensive	 data	 concerning	 member	 institutions	(Christian	and	 Jewish);	 see	 their	website	www.ats.edu	(accessed	26	August	2016).	 Information	from	the	equivalent	organisation	in	the	United	Kingdom,	TRS-UK,	is	not	nearly	as	extensive,	but	a	recent	report	specifically	on	gender	of	students,	researchers	and	teachers	 in	 the	discipline	also	provides	a	summary	of	the	overall	state	of	academic	programs	(Mathew	Guest,	Sonya	Sharmer,	and	Robert	Song,	Gender	and	Career	Progression	in	Theology	and	Religious	Studies	(Durham,	UK:	Durham	University,	2013)).	
constructed	here	about	how	theology	can	and	ought	to	be	understood,	it	cannot	actually	be	divorced	from	the	historical	context	in	which	it	developed,	which	was	largely	 within	 the	 tightly	 controlled	 monoculture	 of	 Christendom.31	 I	 am	 not	naively	suggesting	that	we	just	start	over	again	as	though	the	past	two	thousand	years	never	happened.	I	am,	rather,	wanting	to	look	for	a	way	forward:	starting	from	 where	 we	 are	 now,	 carrying	 our	 problematic	 cultural	 and	 disciplinary	inheritances	with	us	into	our	uncertain	future.			So	how	might	this	work	in	practice?	To	return	to	an	example	from	earlier	in	this	paper,	there	is,	within	Judaism,	a	tradition	of	discourse	on	the	reasons	behind	the	Talmudic	prohibition	against	speculation	on	the	nature	of	God,	creation,	and	the	afterlife:	whether	 it	 is	best	understood	as	an	attempt	to	discourage	withdrawal	from	the	world	into	areas	of	study	in	which	no	conclusions	can	ever	be	reached,	whether	 it	 is	 an	 intentional	polemic	against	 a	particular	 tradition	of	mysticism	that	 risked	destabilising	 the	 religious	authority	of	 the	Tannaim,32	whether	 it	 is	simply	 a	warning	 against	 over-reaching	 the	 capacity	 of	 human	 understanding.	There	are	good	arguments	 to	be	made	 for	 each	of	 these	positions,	 and	 in	 each	case	 it	 is	 also	 useful	 for	 the	 tradition	 of	 interpretation	 stemming	 from	 the	passage	to	be	heard	properly	as	a	critique	of	theology	from	within	a	theological	system,	rather	than	a	prohibition	of	theology	from	the	outside.			I	want	 to	 resist	 the	 cloying	 universalism	which	 Larycia	Hawkins	 and	Miroslav	Volf	 traffic	 in	 when	 they	 insist	 that	 “We	 worship	 the	 same	 God”,	 or	 even	 the	slightly	more	nuanced	claim	 forwarded	by	 Joshua	Ralston	 that	 “we	all	 claim	 to	worship	the	One	God	who	created	the	world	through	God’s	Word”.33		First	of	all,	this	leads	naturally	to	the	equally	unhelpful	(indeed,	in	my	mind,	the	absolutely	counterproductive)	urge	 to	evaluate	all	 religious	discourse	as	a	series	of	 truth-claims,	making	 the	most	 urgent	 question	 that	 can	 be	 asked	within	 theology	 of	religions	 about	 how	 multiple,	 seemingly	 contradictory	 truth-claims	 might	 be	either	 reconciled	 or	 else	 objectively	 prioritised.	 They	 can’t.	 There	 is	 no	 set	 of	data	likely	to	convince	all	parties	of	the	objective	viability	of	any	such	judgement,	and	 so	 “objectivity”	 becomes,	 in	 reality,	 a	 cypher	 for	 compatibility	 with	 the	researcher’s	own	worldview.	Second,	whether	 it	 is	objectively	 true	or	provable	or	not,	a	claim	such	as	“We	all	believe	in	one	God”	is	insufficiently	attentive	to	the	very	 real	 differences	 in	 historical,	 geographical,	 economic,	 social,	 gendered,																																																									31	Even	if	scholars	such	as	Mary-Ann	Perkins	contest	the	historical	narrative	of	Christendom	as	a	whole,	 the	 early	 history	 of	 universities	 was	 still	 very	 closely	 bound	 up	 in	 the	 concerns	 of	 a	Christian	society	and,	specifically,	with	the	teaching	and	dissemination	of	Christian	theology.		See	Perkins,	Christendom	and	European	Identity:	The	Legacy	of	a	Grand	Narrative	Since	1789	(Walter	de	 Gruyter	 &	 Co,	 2004);	A	 History	 of	 the	 University	 in	 Europe,	 vols	 I-IV,	 general	 editor	Walter	Rüegg	 (Cambridge:	 Cambridge	 University	 Press,	 1992-2010);	 David	 Ford,	 “Christianity	 and	Universities	Today:	A	Double	Manifesto”,	Third	Lord	Dearing	Memorial	Lecture,	delivered	2011;	archived	at	http://www.cathedralsgroup.org.uk/Uploads/Dearing2011.pdf.	32	 For	 example,	 Yonatan	 Kolatch	 reads	 it	 as	 a	 restriction	 of	 the	 dissemination	 of	 Kabbalah,	although	 the	 dates	 for	 the	 Mishnaic	 text	 appear	 to	 be	 slightly	 too	 early	 compared	 to	 the	development	 of	 modern	 Kabbalah	 for	 that	 to	 be	 a	 historically	 accurate	 understanding	 of	 the	original	 text.	Masters	 of	 the	Word:	 Traditional	 Jewish	Bible	 Commentary	 from	 the	 First	 Through	
Tenth	Centuries	(Jerusalem:	Ktav,	2006)	p.	239.	33	 Joshua	Ralston,	 “The	 Same	God,	 or	 the	One	God?	On	 the	Limitations	 and	 Implications	of	 the	Wheaton	 Affair”	 ABC	 Religion	 &	 Ethics,	 12	 January	 2016	http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2016/01/12/4386793.htm	Accessed	31	August	2016.	
power	 contexts	 that	 have	 contributed	 to	 shaping	 the	 cultural	 inheritances	 of	different	religious	traditions,	which	in	turn	dictate	the	vastly	divergent	ways	in	which	 the	object	 of	 belief	 (or	non-belief)	 is	understood.	And	we	must	 take	 the	idea	of	cultural	inheritance	quite	seriously:	as	atheist	Jews	and	Muslims—not	to	mention	radical	Christian	theologians—are	well	aware,	it	is	possible	to	be	deeply	connected	to	a	religious	tradition,	to	speak	from	and	into	that	tradition,	without	one’s	source	of	connection	being	“belief”	as	it	is	normally	understood.			Likewise,	I	want	to	find	a	way	of	avoiding	either	the	easy	slide	into	relativism	or	a	 turn	 to	 comparative	 study	 simply	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 comparison.	 It	 is	 poor	reasoning	to	presume	the	conclusion,	and	while	“every	religion	has	something	to	offer	the	world”	may	get	points	for	optimism,	it	is	a	question	no	less	begged	than	the	 superiority	 of	 Christianity	which	has	 animated	 so	much	of	 the	disciplinary	history	 of	 theology.	 We	 should	 take	 seriously	 the	 critique	 of	 the	 category	 of	religion,	and	categories	such	as	“scripture”	and	“transcendence”,	attempting	not	to	 replicate	 the	 errors	 made	 in	 previous	 generations	 of	 ascribing	 religious	significance	only	to	the	aspects	of	a	system	which	appear	to	have	some	analogue	in	already-existing	Christian	theological	categories.			In	 so	 doing,	 it	 is	 to	 be	 expected	 that	 new	 categories	will	 emerge,	 and	 existing	categories	 be	 destabilised.	My	work	 on	memorialisation,	 or,	more	 recently,	 on	the	 assumptions	 underlying	 discourses	 of	 forgiveness	 in	 modern	 Judaism	 and	Christianity,	or	Jayne	Svenungsson’s	work	on	messianic	ideas	in	the	philosophy	of	history	are	very	early,	and	still—especially	in	the	case	of	my	own	work—quite	limited,	 examples	 of	 the	 potential	 of	 such	 an	 approach,	 in	 which	 defining	 the	boundaries	of	a	concept	and	carefully	mapping	their	shift	as	it	passes	from	one	tradition	to	another	help	us	to	understand	a	bit	better	the	public	space	which	is	now	necessarily	negotiated	between	inheritors	of	different	religious	systems.			Whether	or	not	we	all	believe	 in	one	God,	 the	same	God,	or	any	God	at	all,	our	belief	 drives	 our	 actions	 in	 the	 world	 which	 we	 share	 with	 one	 another.	 It	 is	therefore	 an	urgent	 social	 issue	 to	 recognise	 that	we	understand	 that	 belief	 in	distinct,	 not	 necessarily	 easily	 compatible	 ways.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 tasks	 of	theology	going	forward	must	be	to	subject	these	differences	to	an	intensely	open	examination.		
